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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

-vs.-

45221

VEI{L FARNSWORTH,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant, Verl Farnsworth, was convicted of
~Peond

degree murder by a jury in a trial before the

Honorable Bryant H. Croft, .Ju<lg<>.

DISPOSITION OF rrHE

CASF~

BY LO\VER COURT
The defendant was sentenced to the indeterminate
tenn as provided by law for the crime of second degree
li\lll'Qf'l'.
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RELIEF SOUGHrr OX APPEAL
The defendant requests the court to reverse the d<'<'ision of the lower court and to set asidt~ the convietion
of murder in the second d('gre('. In the alternative, the>
appellant se<:>ks a new trial based upon the enors C'o11imittt>d by the trial eonrt.
1

Srl'A'1 E~11,_:Nrl'

OF FACTS

On May 27, 1967 Verl Farnsworth, the defendant
shot and killed James Roger Farnsworth, his son, at tlie
residence located at 1215 Stewart Strf'et, Salt Lake City,
l~tah.

On May 27, 1967 Ralph \V. Whittaker, Salt Lak(•
City Police Department was hailed down by n<>ighhor,
l\frs. "Wilson, to invPstigate the shooting that ocenrrPd just
minutes before ( rnt 89)' He walk Pel into thP resiclP!lC'('
at 1215 St('wart Stret>t, Salt Lah City lTtah, and ohst>n't•d
the son on tlw living room floor and dPfrndant sitting in
a chair (TH-. 92). He also ohserwd tlw wifo of th<• cl<'fendant and mother of the victim in the living room.
Thereupon he took possession of a 22 cloublP adion hand
gnn that was near the ddendant. l It> took the ddernlmit
out to the patrol car, plaePd him mH.1<•r anest aml plac('<l
handcuffs on him ('1'H, 7-1-). }Ip ohse1·v< d that tlwre w«n·
0

two shots spent in the \\'(•:1pon. 'l'hen•art«r, lw rpcPiw<l
anotlwr \\'<•apon from m10tlwr 11w1111wr of tlw Salt Lnk 1•
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City Police Dc>partment which was a 22 caliber hand gun
single action made in -west Germany. He observed that
tlie gun was uncocked and one round had been expended
('rR 9G-~>7). At tlw time of the officer's entrance the defrnclant made the statement that he had shot the boy,
tliat he was not sorry and hoped that he did not die for
his "TifP's sake (TR. 98).
Zelda ·Wilson, a neighbor living across the street
and three houses down from the scene of the accident,
testified as to hearing loud arguing and voices. She
specifically indicated that she heard the defendant say
"l'll kill you" (TR. 134). After these words were uttered
she ohserved tlw defendant come outside the residence
obtained a weapon from his car parked in the driveway
and the dPfendant fired one shot in the air (TR. 134).
Prior to observing this incident, she had observed the
<lei'Pndant at a local grocery store and indicated that she
<letected a strong ordor of alcohol and that it was her
opinion that the defendant was under the influence of
alcohol wlwn lw was ohserved at the store (TR 144 ).
Hobert Stewart, pathologist, testified that he condncte<l a post-mortem examination on May 27, 1967 at
~t.

Mark's Hospital ('I1R. 8-1-). A slug was removed from

tl1P

vidim and tlw <l<>ath was irnmediately due to damage

t n the heart and lungs en ns<>d hy tlw hull Pt (TR. 88).
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station attendants he took it to \YOrk (TR 180). Defendant further testified that he knew that the victim kept
his gun in the house, however, he was not sure where the
weapon ·was kept. He further \Vas aware that the victim's
weapon was a single action hand weapon and that in
order to fire the same one must cock the hairm1er before
you can pull the trigger (TR. UH). At the time that thP
shooting occurred he testi.t1Pd that he didn't havr~ time to
observe the position of the hammer of the victim's gun.
He further was aware that the victim's gun was loaded
('TR. 188). Defendant testified that he did not intend
to kill his son and that the only reason he shot the Hon
was because he felt that his son was going to shoot him
(TR. 182). Moreover, at the time the defendant got the
weapon he intendr~d only to scare his son.
On cross-examination the defendant's story was es~entially the same. The prosecution pointed out srveral
inconsistent statements made by the defendant to the officers who immediately arrived at the scene and who transported the defendant en route to the hospital (TR. 182).
The prosecution cross-examined the defendant as to prior
threats to other people with his weapon (TR. 183). '!.'he
court over ruled the defendant's objection thereto a'
heing prejudicial and irrelPvant. On rebuttal tlic' prosecution called Slterrv Farnsworth, daughter of defendant, who testified that tlw son got the weapon after shr
heard the shot fired by the defendant oufaicle thr resiclr>nce

crR. 227).
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Aft<>r the defendant was arrested at the scene, he was
transported to the Salt Lake City Police Department
by Officer -Whittaker. En route Officer 'Whittaker stopped the vehicle to advise the defendant of his rights
under l\Iiranda, using the Miranda card (TR 191). The
clPfendant began to speak about the circumstances of the
incident and the officer asked the defendant that if by
talking lw was waiving his rights to an attorney, whereupon the defendant stated "I guess I ought to talk to a
];rnr>·er hdore I make a formal statement, but I'll tell you
what happen Pd." Nothing further was said regarding
the request for counsel. After the defendant had arrived
~t the jail he was again interrogated by Officer Leonard
J~lton, Salt Lake City Police Department, who obtained
a tape recording from the defendant. The defendant
moved the trial court to have a hearing outside the
presence of tlH~ jury to determine the constitutionality of
the statement given by the defendant in order that the
prosPcntion could use the same for rebuttal. (TR. 188).
DPfernlant ·was called in connection with the defense
counsel's rPquest to exclude the statement and the defl'ndant tPstified in suhstancP that he advised the offi<·<·r~ that he guessed lw ought to have an attorney but that
11<' would giv0 the officer a stafrment (TR 197). Defrndant further testified that he did not know the diff<T<>nee lwtwePn a formal or informal statement (TR.
I~IS). ?II oreowr, defendant testified that prior to the
ti111<· tl1t> tape was taken he advised the officers that he
did not havf' an attornev and the officer replied, "Well,
m·'ll appoint yon an attorn<>y so wt>'ll have an attorney
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there." (TR. 199). Moreover, the defendant testiforJ
that he did not intend to waive his right to have an at.
torney present and although he understood they were
taking his statement, he did not understand the fnnda.
mental part of waiving his right (TR 199).
On cross examination dt•f endant testified in responsp
to the prosecutor's question that he did not ask for one
"attorney" at that time (TR 200). The tape of the dPfendant was f'ntered without objection by defense at thi,
time for the purpose of the motion to suppress (TR
202). The trial court ruled that the admissions by tlw
defendant are admissible for impeachment purpo~e'
(TR. 206).
Thereafter Officer l~lton was n'called as a rebuttal
witness and testified as to certain statements made to
him during the tinw of intf'rrogation (TR. 121-1'.23).
The defendant was convicted by a jury of second
degree murder and sentenced to tht> Ftah State Prison
for an indeterminate te11n. Othe>r pertinent facts will lw
brought out during the argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
DEFENDANT'S STATEMEN'TS WERE ADMISSIBLE AFTER
DEFENDANT HAD INDICATED A DESIRE TO TALK TO
AN ATTORNEY.
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The appellant took the witness stand in his own
behalf. After the appellant rested the prosecution, over
appellant's objection as to the admissibility of said statements, used the appellant's prior oral statements to impeach the appellant's testimony. The def en<lant contends
that the trial court erred permitting the prosecution to
use the defendant's prior statements for impeachment.
A hearing was held outside the presence of the jury
regarding the admissibility of the defendant's prior
statenwnts (11 R 191). Officer Whittaker testified that
lw arTc>sted thf' defendant and \\'hile c>n route to the
police station advised the defendant of his rights by
reading th<~ Miranda card (TR. 192). After the defendant was advised, the officer testified as follows:
"A.

Oh, he started to talk about the circumstances
of the incident again and I asked him if in so
doing he was waiving his rights to an attorney
and he said, 'I guess I ought to talk to a
lawyer before I make a formal statement, but
I'll tetl you what happened.' "

Thertiafh•r, at tlw polict> station, a tape was made (TR
l!l8).

Tlw <lPf endant was called in his own behalf at the
lH·aring- to suppress the statement. He testified that he
was unawarP of thf' diffrrence bf'tween a formal or in-

formal statenwnt (TR 198). FurthPr, he told tlw office
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"that I guess l ought to have an attonwy, but I would
give him a statement" (TR 197). Furth<>r, the defendant
didn't understand the fundamental part of waiving his
rights (TR 199).
Fnder the rulf' in Miranda r. Arizona, 38.t 11.S . .t3G, lG
L ed. 2d G94, 89 S. Ct. 1602, tlw iiros<~cution may not llSP
statf'ments, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unles,
it demonstrates thl• use of procedural safeguards effective to SPCUn' tlw privilege against self-incrimination.

custodial interrogation, we mean que~
tioning initiated by la\\' enforcenwnt officers after
a person has bePn taken into custody ... As for '
the procedural safeguards to ht> ernploy<>d, ... thP
following rneasures are rt>qnired. Prior to any
<gwstions, the iwrson must hP warnPd that ht• lias
a right to remain silent, that any state11wnt he
doPs make may be used as (_•vidern·e against hirn,
and that hP has a right to the presence of an
attorney, eitlwr retained or appointed." 384 u.S.
at 44.t, 1 ()Led 2d at 706.
"B~r

Once these warnings have been givlm, the d<'fendant's response deterrnim•s the stl~ps the police can thereafter pursue. Ordinarily tlw defendant will either req nest counst>l, or lw will \\'aive tllP right of counsel, or lie
will makP sollH' stat<>nwnt which is neithPr a request for
nor a waiv<>r of colmsf·l.
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If the defendant specifically requests counsel, this
response affirmatively guarantees defendant's right to
counsel before any any questioning can take place. Any
answers by the defendant to the questions put by police
are not adamissible because they violate his right of
eounsel (Gth Amendment).
"An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. . . . [But] such
[a] request affirmatively secures his right to have
one . . . " 38G U.S. at 470, 16 L. ed. 2d a 720.
'' . . . If the individual states that he wants
an attorney, the interrogation must cease until
the attornPy is present." 386 U.S. at 474, 16 L ed
~d at 72:-:l.
". . . if he indicates in any manner and at any
stage of he process that he wishes to consult with
an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning." 384- U.S. at 444-16 Led 2d at 70G.
If the defendant exprf'ssly waives or if he neither
n·qu<>sts nor waives his right to counsel, questions may
he askPd of the defendant. Ho\\'ever, in court, there is
no presumption of waiver. Instead there is a heavy
hurdrn on the prosecution to demonstrate ( 1) that the
(lPf('ndant >rniv<>d his rights and (2) that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against
~P]f inerimination. If that heavy burden is met, the
prospcntion can us<' answers made by the defendant in
intPrrogation. In each case (of \\'aiver or of neither waiver
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nor request), the admissibility of the fruits of the int(·rrogation is dependent upon tlw prosecution's meeting of
its heavy burden to demonstrate tlw eiJectin•nrss of
the wain•r.
''The defendant rna ,. waive effectuation of
these rights }JI'ovid0.J th~.. \\·aiver is made voluntarily, knowinITT·, and i11tt>lligently.~' 38-1 r.s. at
-!-+-!, 16 L t>d :2cl at 70().
"Presuming \Yaiver from a silent rt>cord is
impermissible. The rc-'cord must sho\\·, or tlwrv
must be an allegation and t>Yidence ,,-hich shml',
that an accused \\·as offered counsel hnt intelligently and understandingly rt>jt>ctPd tlw offrr.
Anything 11-'ss is not a wain•r."
.. If the interrogation c·ontinues without the
presPnce of an attorney and a statement is takrn,
a heavy burden n_.sts on tlw g·ovt-rnment to demonstrate that the dt>f endant kno\\·ingly and intelligentl:· waived his privil<'ge against sPlf incrimination and his right to rf'tained or appointPll
('Ol1nS('l. . . . " :~8+ r.s. at -t7;) 1() L Pd :2d 72..J..
In Miranda there is sornt> language coneerning what
could constitute waive>r hut there is also somP language
about what 1cill 11ot constitute waiver.
"An express statement that tlw incliYidnal
is willing to make a statenwnt and does not want
an attorney could constitnt<' a wain·r, but a yalid
waiver wiiI not lw prPsmnPd simply from tlH'
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sile~ce of the accused after warnings are given
or snnply from the fact that confession was in fact
eventually obtained ... " 284 L.S. at 475, 16 L ed
2d at 724.

"The mere fact that he mav have answered
some questions or volunteered ·some statements
on his own does not deprive him of the right to
refrain from answering any further inquiries
until he has consulted \vith an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned." 384 r.s. -145, lG
Led 2d at 707.
" . . . [H]is failure to ask for a lawyer does
not ~onstitute a waiver." 384 U.S. at 470, 16 L ed
2d at 72.
"If the defendant makes any volunteered
statements, i.e., statements made not in response to
any question put to the defendant by the police,
these statements are admissible in evidence because they do not infringe on the defendant's
rights against self incrimination."

"The fundamental import of the privilege
while an individual is in custody is not whether
he is allowed to talk to the police without the
benefits of warnings and counsel, but whether he
can be interrogated ... Volunteer statements of
anv kind are not barred bv the Fifth Amendment
and their admissibility is ~ot affected by our holding today." 384 F.D. at -173 1GL ed 2d at 726.
"To summarize ... the following measures
are requirt>d: He must be warned prior to any
questions required that he has the right to the
presencP of an attorney. Opportunity to exercise
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[ thi~ right] n~ust be afforded to him throughout
the mterrogation. After such warnings have bPen
given, and such opportunity afforded him, the
individual may knowingly and intelligently waiVP
[this right] and agree to answer questions or make
a statement. But unless such warnings and waiver
are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interogation can
be used against him." 384 P.S. at "178, -±79; 1G L
ed 2d at 726.
In the prc>sen t case, the ~liranda ·warnings were
given the defendant almost irmnediah'ly upon arTPst.
The defendant's response to these warnings, as testified
to by the the arresting officer was, "I guess I ought to
talk to a lawyer before I make a formal statement, hut
I'll tell you what happened." (TR 193). This rPsponsP
fits in the category of request for counsel or at least
that of a non-r<>quest or non-waivPr of eonns<~l.

It is possibly a request for coun:-:c>l lwcause inMirandn
the U.S. Supreme Court held that:
" . . . [i]f [a suspect) indicates in any manner and at any stag<~ of the process that he wishes
to consult with an attorney before speaking ther<'
can he no questioning." 38-1- F.S. at -1--14-A-1-5.
c' ....... , ·J2
L ed
,
· L ('. upp, ...... 1T ....,
In t l1e ease of 1'razter
~
2d 684, the d<'frndant was charged with homicide. After
he was given a somewhat abbreviated description of his
. constitutional rights, he was questioned. The clefondant
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was reluctant to talk and after starting to tell his story,
"he again showed signs of reluctance and said, 'I think
I better get a lawyer before I talk anymore. I am going
to get into trouble more than I am now.' " 22 L ed 2d 68.
The Court affirmed the conviction because the case was
post-Escobedo but pre-1\Iiranda and said Miranda in that
instance was to be applied at the discretion of the State
Supreme Courts. As dicta however, th<" court said:
"Pf'titioner argues that his statement about
getting a lawyer \\'as sufficient to bring Escobedo
have stovped the questioning and obtained counsel
into play and that the police should immediately
for him. We might agree "'ere Miranda applicable
in this case [for the reasons set forth in the
Miranda quotation above] ... " Frazier v. Cupp,
______ F.S. at ______ , 22 Led 2d at 68 ____ .
If, however, the statement by the defendant is not a
rrquest for C'ounsel, it is necessarily (1) an express
waiver, or (2) a statf'mPnt which is neither a specific
request nor an express waivPr. Defendant's contention
is that it was at least a non-request non-waiver statement
bPcausP the defendant did not expressly state that he
did not want an attorney. In fact there is testimony
that the defendant had wanted an attorney present during tlw tape reeording (T. 199-200).
In any cast>, tivPn if the right to counsel is expressly
\\'a ive<l :
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" [ i Jf th0 inkrrogation continues without thr
presfmce of an attorney and a statenwnt is taken,
a heavy burdPn rt-sts on the g·overnment to demonstrate that tlw defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his ... right to ... eounsel." Miranda, 3S4 F.S. at 475, Hi Led at 724.
The prosecution in this case did not nwet its burden.
The evidence supporting this burclPn simply goes to the
question of whether or not th" dt-f endant spPcifically
requE'stE'd connsP 1.
In the case of Swenson v. Bosler, 38G U.S. 258 at 260,
18 L et 2d 33 at 36, 87 S. Ct. 996 (1967) the Court said
that "it is now settlE'd 'that where thE' assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, thP right to be furnishrd
counsel does not depend on a rt>quest." (citing) Comley
'V.

Cochran, 3G9 U.S. 50(), 8 L Pd :2cl 70, IG, 82 S. Ct. SS-t."
A case sp0-cifically in point is Sullins v. U.S., 38!) K

2d 985 (CA 10 1965) where four persons were arrPstrd
and then given the Miranda warnings. The defendants
contended that they had specifically asked for counsel.
The testifying policP officers dPni(•d that they had n·quested counsf•l at any time hut thP officers did testify
that at no timP had any one of the defendants expr<>ssly
said that he did not want to comnlt a lawyer heforc questioning. Tht> con rt said:
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"The testimony of the officers that none of
the accused specifically declined consultation with
a lawyer before answering questions is fatal to
the admissibility of their inculpatory statements,
for the Court said in Miranda v. United States,
that not only doc~s 'a lwavy burden' rest upon the
Government to show a waiver of the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination and the right
to retained or appointed counsel but also that
iuaiver is never to be presumed from failure to ask
for counsel." 389 F.2d at p. 988.
The next question to be discussed is whether statenwnts made by the dpfendant can be used to impeach
his own tt>stimony. Tlw majority of jurisdictions and the
h(•ttrr n;asoned law prohibits such use. In People v.
l.'nderzrnod (Cal 19G-1) 389 P.2d 937, the defendant was
charged with and convicted of rape, robbery and kidnapping. '1 he prosecution attempted to impeach defendant's
testimony hy using admissions that he had made to the
poliC'P during admittedly irnpropt>r interrogation. The
court said:
1

'' [i]t is ... established in California and many
otlwr jurisdictions that involuntary confessions
may not he used for purposes of impeaching the
tPstimony of an accused. (Cast's cited.) ·we beliew a similar rult> should operate to exclude involuntary admissions wlwn they are offered for
that purj)()se, and it has been so held in a number
of jurisdictions. (People v. Hiller, 2 Ill. 2d 323,
118 N.E. 2d 11, 13; Stalf v. Palmer, 232 La. 468,
!)-J. So. 2d -J.39, 444--J.45, State v. Burnett, 357 Mo.
]()(), 20(i S."\Y. 2<l 8-J.fi, 8-J.7-848; St't' 89 AL R 2d 478,
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479.). ·. : . [\V]e should not permit an accused's

cred1b1hty to be attacked by the use of an involuntary statement which would be inadmissible as
affirmative evidence .... '' 389 P.2d at p. 941.
In Johnson v. G.S., 3-14 F.2<l u;:1 (CADC 1%4) thL·
defendant was not represented by counsel at the time
of his interrogation which produced a confrssion. A:,;
the court Raid,

"in general, evidence which is inadmissible to
prow~ the case in chief is inadmissible for all
purposes unless the defendant himself introdur(~s
the evidence or is in some manner estopped from
objecting to its use. The evidence is not rendered
admissible merely because the defrndant testifies
in his own he half." at Hi4, 1()5.
The basis for this rule is strongly stated in Harrold
v. Territory of Okl.ahonw, 1G9 F. 47, 50 (8th Cireuit, 190H)
"The privilege granted to an aecused pen;on
of testifying on his own behalf would be a poor end
and useless one indePd if lw could (~xercise it only
on condition that Pvery incompetent confession
[or statement] induced by tlw promises, or wrungfrom him bv the unl"wafnl secret inquisitions and
criminating. suggestions, of arresting or holdingoffic0rs, :::;hould lwcornt> <>YidPnCP aairn;t him."
'fhe result should lw tlw sallH' \dwnPY('r th<> con f L'ssion
or statement is obtained in violation of tlw defendant':<
right to rounseL
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As specifically stated in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 44,
J; cd 2d at 706,

l(i

"The prosecution may not use statements ...
sterruning from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards affective to secure the privilege
against self-icrimination."
rrhen--fore, the court erred in allowing the pros~u
tion to use statements made by the defendant which were
obtained by violating his right to counsel before questioning to impeach the defendant's testimony because defendant affirmatively requested counsel, or the prose<'ntion failed to meet its heavy burden to demonstrate that
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to counsel.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION ON INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER WHERE THE FACTS JUSTIFY THE SAME.

r111w defrndant requested an instruction on involuntar.\T marn;laughter. This instruction was submitted on
tl10 tlwory that the jury could find, under the facts, that
the dPfendant committed an unlawful act not amounting
lo a f(·lony. rrhe defendant claimed self defense and undl'l' this claim, the acts of the defendant would not
nrnount to a fp]ony.
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This court very recently announcPd in State v. Gillian, filed January 8, 1970, statPd:
"One of the foundational principles in n~gard
to the submission of issues to juries is that wlwn·
the parties so request they are entitled to haw
instructions given upon t Lt'ir thory of the case; and
this includes on lPsser offrnses if anv reasonahlt'
view of the t>vidence would support s~ch a wrdid.
rrhis is in aC"cord with authorities generall~', 3 and
with the adjudications of this court, as stated
in a number of cases dealing with instructing on
lesser offenses: In the cmw of StatP v .•Johnson'
it is said:
'That the deft'ndant is t'ntitlPd to haw
the jury instructed on his theory of the casf'
if tht're is any substantial 0vide>nce to justify
hriving sneh an instruction.
Of similar import is Stat<' v.

N<>~wton

:""

''If tlw jury acct>ptt>d lwr Vt'rsion of the occurrence, that it was in such a statP of p111otional upset that she got the pistol and firPd it into the room
several times intl~nding only to scare :Miller, her
offense could he found to he involuntary manslauO'hter
in that it \Vas a killing which resulted
0
'in the commission of an unlawful act not amountin O' to a fplonv' · 01· upon a different view of the
h
•
'
facts eonl<l he found to he volnntar~, rnanslangfrr
as a killing· 'upon a sudden quarrPl or in thP lw~:t
of passion," and tlw fact that anotlw1· 111an ac.e1dentallY ht>('UlIH' tht> vidi111 would not necessarily
make tl1e cri11w mw of a high<'r d0gTPP. \"Vithont
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fur_ther extenuation, it is also true that if the jury
heheved that there was an intent to kill, it may
not have believed beyond a reasonable doubt some
other element required to make the crime murder
in the first degree, in which event it would be
murder in the second degree. 9 "
Thus, under the most recent pronouncement of this
court, the trial court should, under law, have granted
the defendant's requested instruction on involuntary
manslaughter.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
PROSECUTION, OVER THE DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION
TO CROSS EXAMINE THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ACTS
OF VIOLENCE INVOLVING PERSONS OTHER THAN THE

VICTIM.

On cross examination of the defendant, the proseeution, over thP Defendant's objection illicited testimony
that the defendant had threatened to shoot the dog and
eat (TR 184) and had threatened to kill other members
of the family (TR 185). 1\foreover, the prosecution was
]H'rmitted to ask questions regrading threats made by
ih0 defondant some two years ago (TR 185).

As rebuttal, Sherry Farnsworth was called and testifiPd as to the in('ident wherein the defendant said he ;vas
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gomg to take care of tlwm (cat) and he was going to
shoot them ( 11 H 225). No objection was made hy defense
counsel.
The defendant contends that procPdure usf'd lw the
prosecution was highly in·ejudicial and inflammatory.
The incident regarding the thn·ats of the defendant direeted to the dog and cat can only lw construed as pointing
out to the jury that the defrndant is not a lover of animals and tlwn•fon~ must be a had person. It elearly
does not go to the state of mind of tlw defendant with
regard to the victim. This tPstirnony was further irnbedded in the jury's mind when the prosecution wm; 1wrmittt>d to bring up the incident by the usf' of a rt>hnttal
witrn•ss, Slwrry Farnsworth.
Evidence is not admissihle if its d'foct is nwrely to
disgrace the defendant or slww his propensity to C'Olllmit crime. State v. Dickerson, L2 1Ttah 2d 8, i3Gl P. 2d
412 (1961) This case was cit<>d with approval in Stall'
·v. ChT/ia.11, fi!Pcl 8 Jan nary 1970.
The defendant submits that the tPstimony regarding
the threats to dogs and cats was prejudicial. It cannot lw
stated ·with an.v assurance that then• would not haw lJPrn
a different n•sult in thP absern·(• of th<> enor in cross l~X
amining tlw def Pndant ahout tlu• incid(•nts it lllnst lw J'f'garded as prPjudieial. State

1·.

Dicke1·.-.·011, snpra. l\1ore-

ov0r, the question reganlinp: a tltrPat to the ,-idim
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some two years prior falls within the realm of "unproven
accusation" which was calculated to degrade the defendant in the eyes of the jury.
POINT IV
THE

EVIDENCE DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE JURY

VERDICT OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER.

'l'he Defendant respectfully submits that, under the
cireumstances of the killing, the jury verdict is unsupportable by the evidence. The defendant contends that
reasonable minds could not differ as to the facts leading
up to tlit> fatal shot.
'l,he facts, in a light most favorable to the jury verdict
doe:-; not support the verdict of murder in the second
dc'gn•P. The ddendant's testimony clearly shows that
thP victim was making threats against his personal safety
and well-being. Prior contacts with the victim lead to
thti defendant having his teeth broken and injury to his
ribs ( 1,R. 170). 'l,his was undisputed. On the day of the
shooting, the victim made threats against the defendant
\\'hi!(' standing nPar the chair wht>re the defendant was
sr•at<~cl.

Although, tlwre is some dispute as to when the

\'idim wmt into the lwdroom for his gun, the defendant

statPd that each went for his about the same time (TR.
177),

'i,lw defendant got his gun from his care parked

1JUtsidf• of th<' hons<'. I ft- fired one shot to "scare the
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victim.'' \Vhen he re-<'ntered tlw house, the victim had
his gun levelf'd at the defendant; whereupon the defendant figured "it -was him or me." (TR.178). 'I1he defendant fired, without taking aim. Further, the defendant
did not observe the position of the hammer on the victim\:
gun.
In view of the situation which confronted the defendant at the time of the firing, it cannot be said that what
he did was not nec0so:ary to protect his own life. TlH•
initial argt1rnPnts wPre provoked by the victim who \\'a'
the larger of the two. It was the defendant's house. No
more than onP shot was fired to rernoVf' the peril faeingthe defrndant.
llnder the standard set for by this court, the evidence
does not justify the verdict of second degree murder. At
the very least, voluntary manslaughter may be supportable by the evidence.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments raised, the appelllant respectfully requests that th(~ conviction be reversed and
the case rmnanded. In tlw alternative, the appellant
submits that conviction for second deg-ree murder h<'
vacated and that a lesser crime he found under the facts
of the case.
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Respectfully submitted,

JIMI MITSUNAGA
731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attornpy for Defendant
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